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Address: Puslitbang Lektur dan Khazanah Keagamaan
Badan Litbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI
Jl. M.H. Thamrin No. 6 Lt. 18 Jakarta
Telp./Facs. 62-21-3920713/3920718
Email: puslitbang_lekturyahoo.co.id
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EDITORIAL NOTES

This edition is concerned with the problems of Muslim movements and social history in Indonesia and Southeast Asia. The purpose of this edition is not totally different from the previous edition that is to promote the cultural heritage of Islam in Indonesia in particular and the world-wide in general. Apart from that, it is certainly to develop ideas relating to the development of Islamic thoughts and movements, social history as cultural heritage in order to be widely known, read and reviewed by the academic community at large.


The first article is written by Azyumardi Azra on Ahlusunnah wal Jamaah in Southeast Asia. This study focusses on the literature used by Malay-Indonesian Ulama and reforms performing their idea to their society. Azra highlights that the Malay-Indonesian ulama were mostly responsible for earliest reforms of Islamic teaching and Muslim life in the archipelago.

Further study is written by Dadi Darmadi focussing on the historical and global contextualization of intolerance towards religious minority group, such as Ahmadiyah, and it analyzes the recent increased animosity towards them in Indonesia. Dadi Darmadi argues that to understand the current persecution of Ahmadiyah one must begin with an examination of the early
transnational efforts to marginalize Ahmadiyah and their effects on Muslim communities. The Meccan fatwas in focus -- and their reproduction -- provide an example of the ways in which such globalized discourses of exclusion regarding a particular religious group were strategically framed and mobilized in i.e. Lahore, Mecca and few other places, and how these historical and theological factors at play could provide more insight into the rising political intolerance and the criminalization of religious views in Indonesia.

The third article is written by Fakhriati which talks of the use of certain papers in the writing of Islamic manuscripts in Aceh. The article argues that there are two types of Acehnese manuscripts' papers: traditional and imported papers with unique and specific images of watermark. The dominant watermark appeared in the imported papers were crescents which symbolized the typical characteristics of the Islamic sign. Studying on such papers indicates the relationship between the country of producers and the country of of the the paper user.

The next article is written by Erni Budiwanti which discusses about local customs, religion and the reaction of Tuan Guru as teachers and leaders for traditional Islamic school (Pesantren). Tuan Guru had took significant role as a cultural broker. They acted not only for teaching religious matters, but transformed local customs to accerate global need for maintaing ecological balance. The mission has put them into two dilemma. On the one side, they attempt to alter local customs which had many sacral values, and on the other sides, they solve community problem on education and treat enviromental balance.

Further article is written by Sofyan Hadi which studies on manuscript of Khabar Nazam Usiyat collected by family of Syekh Muhammad Said Bonjol, Minangkabau, West Sumatra. He concludes that this manuscript contained a model of Al-Gazali’s Tasawuf Akhlaqi. This manuscript emerged as a response and critics to theological concept occurred at that time in Minangkabau.
Further article is written by Erlita Tantri which highlights on mechanism of Hajj Transportation and its significance in Netherlands East Indies, from 1910 to 1940. From her research, she concludes that during the above period, the role the Dutch colonial to hajj took an important part which they regarded as economical and political issue which effected to colonial sustainability.

The next article is written by Ali Fahruddin which is about the history of arising Rohingya Muslims in Burma and their jihad for seeking their authority. In his works, Ali argues that Rohingya Muslim had no status in their country which then posited them in low level of the Burma community. They in fact should have the right as other community.
THE MECCAN FATWAS AND THE
GLOBALIZED DISCOURSE OF EXCLUSION:
The CASE OF ANTI-AHMADIYAH
MOVEMENTS IN INDONESIA

By Dadi Darmadi

Abstract

This article explains the historical and global contextualization of intolerance towards religious minority group such as Ahmadiyah and it analyzes the recent increased animosity towards them in Indonesia. This paper argues that to understand the current persecution of Ahmadiyah one must begin with an examination of the early transnational efforts to marginalize Ahmadiyah and their effects on Muslim communities. The Meccan fatwas in focus—and their reproduction—provide an example of the ways in which such globalized discourses of exclusion regarding a particular religious group were strategically framed and mobilized in i.e. Lahore, Mecca and few other places, and how these historical and theological factors at play could provide more insight into the rising political intolerance and the criminalization of religious views in Indonesia.

Keywords: Ahmadiyah, minority groups, tolerance, fatwa, transnational Islam, Mecca, Indonesia.

1 This article was mostly taken from a paper previously submitted to a panel on "Religious Freedom and Intolerance in Indonesia" Sponsored by Indonesia and East Timor Studies Committee, the 2012 Annual Conference, Saturday March 17, 2012, the Sheraton Centre Toronto Hotel, Toronto, Canada. I would like to thank a number of colleagues and friends especially Syafa'atun Almirzanah, Najib Burhani, Christopher R. Duncan, Jalaluddin Masduki, Sukidi Mulyadi and Mun’im Sirry for their helpful comments and suggestions to earlier drafts of this paper.
Introduction

In recent years religious freedom in Indonesia has been marred by increased intolerance against religious minorities. Perhaps no group has faced greater persecution than Ahmadiyah, whose followers have been present in Indonesia since 1925 (Beck 2005; Blood 1974; Pijper 1950; Zulkarnain 2005) but have increasingly harassed, attacked and persecuted for their beliefs in recent years (Alfitri 2008; Crouch 2009). How did this change come about?

Recent studies on Ahmadiyah and religious freedom have focused new attention on the "conservative shift" in Indonesian Islam (Bruinessen 2013), the "Islamic turn" amongst secular-nationalists and the government's failure to protect religious freedom. Platzdasch, for example, observes the rise of the “pro-Islam” and intolerant attitudes in public responses to the Ahmadi question (Platzdasch 2011), while other studies specifically looks at the conservative shift within Indonesian Council of Ulama after the regime change in 1998 (Ropi 2010). Meanwhile, recent ICG report focus on the 2008 government regulation on Ahmadiyah and investigates some factors contributing to the rise of anti-Ahmadi in Indonesia: (1) systematic lobbying of the bureaucracy; (2) the search for issues that would help hardliners mobilize and expand membership; (3) the unprecedented influence of MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia); (4) the political manoeuvring related to national and local elections; (5) sentiments to pro-Islam at the grass-root and top levels of government officials (International Crisis Group 2008). In 2011, of all violations on religious freedom in Indonesia, about half of them committed by various actors against the Ahmadiyah groups (Wahid Institute 2011).

In this article, I seek to investigate the historical and global contextualization of this intolerance towards religious minority group such as Ahmadiyah and it seeks to understand this increased animosity towards them in Indonesia. I argue that to understand
the current persecution of Ahmadiyyah we must begin with an examination of the early transnational efforts to marginalize Ahmadiyyah and their effects on Muslim communities. In what ways that such globalized discourses of exclusion regarding a particular religious group -- framed and mobilized in i.c. Lahore, Mecca and few other places -- might possibly be connected to the rising political intolerance and the criminalization of religious views in Indonesia?

The Global Context of Anti-Ahmadi Movements

Ahmadiyyah (Ahmadiyya) is a transnational religious movement, and its birth dates back to 1889 when a religious leader established a distinctive community in Qadiyan, a small Punjabi town in India. The early Ahmadi community emerged and lived among Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Christians in the British India. The Ahmadiyyah question emerged as soon as Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (MGA), the leader, established his claim to the leadership of his community -- as a religious reformer, the Promised Messiah and the Mahdi awaited by Muslims. This claim sparked controversies among Muslims, following his followers’ claim that MGA had been indeed a Prophet -- thus contesting and confusing the very concept of Islam’s finality of prophethood of Muhammad.

In Southeast Asia, one of the earliest responses came after an anti-Ahmadi rally on 13 July 1925 in Singapore -- several years after an Ahmadi preacher visited Burma, Singapore, Batavia and Surabaya\(^2\) and wrote a book on his lectures in the early 1920s (Kamal-ud-Din 1923). Thousands of Malay Muslims protested the influx and the transmission of Ahmadiyyah literature into the

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Malay world, and asked the government to take actions against it (I. S. Sevea 2009). In the Dutch East Indies, Haji Rasul of West Sumatra voiced some critical arguments against Ahmadiyah teachings promulgated by a Lahore Ahmadi activist in Java in 1926-1927. An Indian learned man Abdul ‘Alim Siddiq al-Qâdirî warned Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama the danger of this Ahmadi teachings, bringing the rupture among inner-circles of Muhammadiyah organization in Jogjakarta, and eventually between Ahmadiyah and Muhammadiyah (Beck 2005; Ichwan 2001). In 1927, Haji Agoes Salim of the Sarekat Islam went back to Mecca, and influenced his Minangkabau muqîmin colleagues to create an organization called Majlis Syura Indonesia in 1928, one of whose goals is to provide resistance to ideology or deviant sects such as Ahmadiyah (Putuhena 2007: 347).

A number of Middle Eastern scholars have responded negatively to the issue of Ahmadiyah, one of the most interesting opinions came from Rashid Rida. In a response to a question from one of his former students in Sambas, Borneo, Rashid Rida in 1928 said that (1) “the Qadiyani sect deviated from Islam by their claim that revelation comes down to their swindler Messiah and his successors”; (2) Rida condemned Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as “dajjâl” (anti-Christ) or al-Masîh al-Dajjâl (the false prophet). Later research finds that Rida had wrongly attributed Muhammad Ali’s work as the work of a Qadiyani (Ichwan 2001).

But, perhaps no place has had the most persistent resistance against the Ahmadis as Pakistan. Before becoming an Islamic republic in 1956, Pakistan was an independent nation for the overwhelming majority of Muslims living in the western and eastern parts of India. Following the partition of India in 1947, many Hindus and Sikhs moved to the neighbouring regions in India, making Pakistan largely a Sunni Muslim state, with Shi’a, Ahmadiyah and few other religious groups as minority groups. With currently more than 170 million Muslims, Pakistan is second only to Indonesia among the largest countries with Muslim
population. This fact also has left the Shi’as and the Ahmadis as easy targets of sectarian conflicts.

In February and March 1953, an anti-Ahmadī riot broke out in Lahore. Maulana Mawdudi wrote a short book questioning the Ahmadī beliefs. Through his political party, the Jama’at-i-Islami, he led an anti-Ahmadī campaign among conservative groups demanding the Ahmadis be declared “non-Muslims.” With political tension escalating, which includes personal intrigues among the Muslim League leaders, strong accusations were made at the Ahmadis for allegedly appropriating some high positions in the new government (Jones 2002). One of the biggest targets was Sir Zafrullah Khan, the first Pakistani Minister of Foreign Affairs. Nearly three hundred people were killed during the riot throughout Punjab, mostly the Ahmadis. This led to the imposition of the martial law in Lahore, the first of its kind in the new and shaky state of Pakistan (Qadeer 2006). As a result, Mawdudi was sentenced to death by martial court but the punishment was commuted to life imprisonment. Under political pressure from the conservative groups and other Muslim hardliners — the strongest supporters of anti-Ahmadī movements — the government finally gave in, and the Mawdudi lawsuit was later acquitted. In later years, Mawdudi received more recognition for his political campaign as well as his writings, home and abroad. Mawdudi’s support for the Indo-Pak war in 1965 generated significant financial and moral supports of Pakistan from the Arab world, making his bigger presence in the Muslim world.

Some twenty years later, sectarian sentiments against the Ahmadis began to reappear in some parts of the country. Meanwhile Mawdudi’s works in “preserving” the unity of Muslims amidst the political difficulties in his home country had received more appreciation overseas. In January 1974, the RAI/WML, in an unprecedented move, presented him the unique title of “Imām al-Muslimīn” (leader of the all-Muslims), to Mawdudi during the organization’s annual conference in Mecca.
Facing fierce criticism back home for handling political situation, in February 1974, the newly elected Prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto showed his sympathy to the Arab world during the Arab-Israeli war, bringing Pakistan a little closer to the Arab world. He hosted an Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) international conference in Lahore, the birthplace and the headquarter of Jama’at-i-Islami, attended by a large numbers of prominent Muslim leaders such as Saudi King Feisal, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat, Libyan president Moammar Khadaffi and others.

Two months later, in April 1974, the Saudi clerics hosted an annual congress of the RAI/WML in Mecca. One of the most important sessions in the conference was the theological discussion on the Qadiani question. How do Muslim scholars deal with it, and in what category should Muslims classify their teachings? For the first time in the history, a large group of Muslim scholars representing virtually all Muslim world, had to respond to the Ahmadiyah issue since its foundation in India in 1889. The result was not surprising and yet equally devastating for Ahmadis of both the Qadiani and the Lahore groups. The special meeting by the RAI/WML commission on Islamic theology had declared unanimously the Qadianis “non-Muslims,” and thus, “outside the fold of Islam.” As some scholars had voiced their opinions against the Ahmadiyah long before this, this fatwa was hardly surprising. However, no one would dispute the enormous consequences it brought to the Muslim world, as we shall see. Back in Pakistan, the Meccan fatwa on Ahmadiyah was followed by another round of political tensions between the supporters of Mawdudi and Jama’at-i-Islami and the Ahmadis. Pakistan saw severe riots between April and May 1974. PM Ali Bhutto and his administration could not do much to handle the worsening situation and gave in to the public pressure to denounce the Ahmadis as “non-Muslims,” and “outside the fold of Islam.”

On 7 September 1974, the Pakistan National Assembly collectively announced the Ahmadis “non-Muslims” because of
their disbelief to the doctrine in the finality of prophethood. In the
eyes of the state, the Ahmadiyah has shifted from a Muslim sect
to a religious minority, outside Islam. Pakistan has become an
Islamic Republic since 1956, but this case point out to the actual
beginning of the history of Islamization in the country. The 1974
Pakistani Constitution (second amendment) Act reads:

“A person who does not believe in the absolute and
unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad
(peace be upon him) the last of Prophets, or who claims to
be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or any description
whatsoever, after Muhammad (peace be upon him), or
recognizes such claimant as a Prophet or a religious
reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the
Constitution or the law.”

There is no direct reference or statement to particular
group in this decree. But no one would deny that this is a state
isolation of a religious group by changing not only its religious
status but also its social being. During Ali Jinnah’s reign, many
would turn to streets and call the Ahadis “kuffār” or infidels; but
in the eye of the state, they were still Muslims, and now they are
formally “kuffār.” Was the state to blame for its failure to protect
its citizens, or was it to blame for lagging behind in denouncing
the “non-Muslim” status of the Ahadis?

Because Ahmadiyah is a transnational movement,
Muslims worldwide seek opinions internationally and for their
responses. And sometimes they even uncritically adopt laws and
decrees in other countries against Ahmadiyah, as though each
country has to have the same solution to the Ahmadi question.
What follows is a discussion on how the Indonesian scholars and
Muslim activists respond to the transnational and global anti-
Ahmadi movements and the ways in which these factors have
some bearings on the production of their fatwas and public
opinions on Ahmadiyah.
Mecca and the Making of Fatwas on Ahmadiyyah

In 1974, the Rābi'atā al-Ālam al-Islāmī or the Muslim World League (RAI/WML) held a conference in Mecca and this organization of Muslim scholars and leaders officially declared that Ahmadiyyah movement was "outside the fold of Islam" (Muslim World League 2007). This is perhaps one of the earliest and unanimous calls by an international Islamic organization against Ahmadiyyah movement, certainly the first of such fatwa issued by RAI/WML. Four years later, in 1978, an assembly of Muslim scholars in an Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) reaffirmed the 1974 fatwa. This edict was signed by a number of Muslim scholars and leaders from the Muslim world such as Saudi Arabia, India, Pakistan, Indonesia and others (Muslim World League 2007). In one of the documents widely distributed to the Muslim world, this fatwa against Ahmadiyyah was signed, among others, by 'Abdulaziz ibn 'Abdillah bin Baz, Shaleh ibn ‘Uthaimin, ‘Abd al-Quddus al-Nadvi, and H. M. Rasjidi. In the 1970s Indonesia was represented in RAI/WML by M. Natsir, an internationally known Muslim scholar and political figure, who himself for many years acted as the Secretary General of this Islamic organization. But, because of his political activism in Indonesia, M. Natsir could not travel widely and freely, and it was likely that H. M. Rasjidi, who was once the Minister of Religion of Indonesia in its formative period in the late 1940s, represented Indonesia and signed the fatwa. Later in their lives, both M. Natsir and H. M. Rasjidi had played a great role in establishing, and thus largely credited for, developing the Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII) (Kahin 2012; Ma'mur 1995; Natsir and Hakiem 2008; Rais 2004), an organization devoted for Islamic missionary

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3 One of the fatwa’s strongest statements can be found here: “That Qadiyanism is a pernicious cult using the name of Islam as a guise for its malicious purposes. Its most conspicuous contradiction of the Islamic tenets is the claim of Prophethood by its leader... this cult must be declared as infidel and out the pale of Islam.”
activities in Indonesia partly linked with Saudi Arabia and Middle Eastern Islamic organizations (Husin 1998).

The signatures of OIC fatwa against Ahmadiyah by international Muslim scholars in OIC conference on July 23, 1978 (Muslim World League 2007).

Despite the widespread call by the RAI/WML to ban Ahmadiyah since 1974, until fairly recently, the Ahmadiyah has continued to exist in Indonesia without any significant trouble (Tempo Magazine 1974). On June 1, 1980, MUI held a National Conference and adopted this ruling and issued a fatwa on Ahmadiyah. Buya Hamka, then the Chairman of MUI and the son of Haji Rasul signed the fatwa; he was among the native scholars from Sumatra who argued against the Ahmadiyah teachings in the
1920s. This is the first fatwa of MUI on Ahmadiyah, and there the ulama organization made two points. First, a statement that after investigating several books on Ahmadiyah, MUI declared that Ahmadiyah is a community that is “outside the fold of Islam,” “misguided” and “misleading.” Second, an appeal that MUI should always consult with the government in addressing the issue of Ahmadiyah (Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 2009).

The first anti-Ahmadi fatwa by the MUI in 1980 partially reflects the differing but growing tendency of some Muslims in Indonesia. While some Muslims leaders were successfully co-opted by the state, others have shifted their attention to the wider political contexts of Muslim ummah. Restrained at home, a number of Muslim thinkers such as M. Natsir and H. M. Rasjidi have planted the seeds of what Egyptian scholar Mona Abaza call as an “Islamic internationalism” in Indonesia (Abaza 2002: 253). This condition is indicated by the rise of transnational movements creeping the urban and higher educational centers of Indonesia which often criticize and demean the roles of traditional Islam in society (Machmudi 2008: 29).

Four years later, in a 1984 National Conference, MUI has issued an important recommendation on Ahmadiyah (Nasution 2008). This time, MUI started to make a more resolute decision to call for all Muslim scholars and preachers to educate Indonesian Muslims the danger of Ahmadiyah’s allegedly “misguided” teachings and its position being “outside the fold of Islam.” MUI asserts that there are at least three main reasons for this fatwa: (1) Ahmadiyah has brought “unrest” within the Muslim community

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4 The 1980 fatwa of MUI states that, “… in accordance with the data and the fatwa found in nine books on Ahmadiyah, the Indonesian Ulama Council issues an edict that Ahmadiyah is a jama’ah (group) that is outside the fold of Islam, misguided and misleading. In addressing the issue of Ahmadiyah, the Indonesian Ulama Council should always be in touch with the government.” Issued in Jakarta, 17 Rajab 1400H/June 1, 1980.
because its doctrines are contrary to the teachings of proper Islam; (2) Ahmadiyah issue has created a stir and divisions among Muslims, especially in the context of prayer ritual, marriage and others, and (3) Ahmadiyah poses a danger to public order and state security.

Up to this point, the MUI has not directly banned the Ahmadiyah as an organization, or its religious missionary activities to the public. However, MUI set out to question the legal status of the Ahmadiyah as a legitimate organization (Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 2006; Mukri and Institut Agama Islam Negeri Raden Intan 2006; Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) 2009). In this recommendation, MUI requests the government and the authorities to review the 1953 Indonesian Minister of Justice decree of JA/22/13, which remains the only state recognition of the Ahmadiyah existence in Indonesia.

It is interesting to note that the MUI did not use a specific religious term to call the Ahmadis being “outside the fold of Islam” until the next fatwa, which was given in 2005. Have the different political conditions during the 1980s and 1990s been the factor to this change? There are two of three points in the fatwa that will be discussed here. During the 7th National Conference of MUI, on 26-29 July 2005, in the first point, the organization reaffirms its 1980 fatwa on Ahmadiyah with a much stronger statement. This time, in addition to labeling the Ahmadiyah “heretical” and “misleading”, the MUI firmly declares “those Muslims who follow their (Ahmadiyah) teachings commit apostasy (leaving Islam) — mutrad (keluar dari Islam).” Then, in the third point, the MUI told that Indonesian government is

5 In Indonesian, the 2005 MUI fatwa on Ahmadiyah reads: Menegaskan kembali fatwa MUI dalam MUNAS II Tahun 1980 yang menetapkan bahwa Aliran Ahmadiyah berada di luar Islam, sesat dan menyesatkan, serta orang Islam yang mengikutinya adalah murtad (keluar dari Islam).
obliged to ban the dissemination of Ahmadiyah teachings and freeze its organization and close all of its activities.

The latest MUI fatwa on Ahmadiyah sounds very commanding, but fatwas and opinions on the streets have been far more critical and stern. Among them are the DDII activists who have been voicing loudly against the Ahmadis in Indonesia. They even set up a specific organization such as LPPI to focus on their anti-Ahmadi and anti-misguided sects within Muslim communities. LPPI activists such as M. Amin Djamaluddin has written a number of books with serious accusations on the erroneous of Ahmadiyah teachings (Djamaluddin, Sudjangi, and Indonesia) 2002; Djamaluddin 2007, 2008).

Some of these writings reflect on the importance of the 1974 Meccan fatwas and the 1953 Lahore petitions against the Ahmadis. The two are closely intertwined. The fatwa was triggered by the sectarian/anti-Ahmadi movements in Pakistan in the early 1970s, which originated in the early 1950s, promulgated by conservative Muslim clerics such as Mawdudi. Mawdudi’s ideas are quite popular between DDII and few other Islamic circles in Indonesia. Their leaders (M. Natsir and H. M. Rasjidi) have been active in RAI/WML for decades. This article does not focus on tracking the roles of individuals in promulgating or igniting social tension among Muslim groups, but as we shall see, it would suggest the importance of such a close alliance among Muslim scholars and clerics producing their views within certain framework, i.e. that of RAI/WML, and in how and the ways in which such network help disseminate these views — and vice versa — would eventually have some bearings on the increased tensions between Muslims and Ahmadis in the Muslim world. As this article clearly suggests, the past incidents in Pakistan in the 1970s and the 1980s, and recent events in Indonesia involving the Ahmadis are perhaps two primary examples of how these tensions and violence against Ahmadiyah have been cause by various
factors, and these events have gone through a series of complex scenarios, some of which revolve around the importance of such trans-national networks of scholars and how their views are reproduced in local contexts.

It took almost 25 years for MUI to produce a defining status Ahmadiyah, from a pure religious fatwa into a more complex and nuanced decision to exclude Ahmadiyah from the rest. This gradual exclusion of Ahmadiyah in the fatwas of MUI needs further elaboration, not only for its local social and political contexts at home, but also the growing global exclusion of Ahmadiyah and the Ahmadis in the Muslim world. In the first two fatwas, MUI seems to concern with the theological differences within Ahmadiyah—the general ummah relations, and frequently quotes the “social unity” as the main reason. This was the case with both the 1980 fatwa and the 1984.

Although there is no specific reference to Ahmadiyah being kāfir⁶ (infidels) in the 1980 fatwa and its recommended addendum in 1984, many began to candidly interpret the idea of Ahmadiyah being “outside the fold of Islam” and started calling the Ahmadis with the label of murtadd or kāfir or both—two different terms with two different legal consequences.⁷ Of course, this is not a new scheme, many Muslim scholars since medieval times had responded the same way to the issue of heresy; in fact,

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⁶ Often used somewhat interchangeably, in Sunni tradition, the punishment of murtadd is different from the punishment of kāfir. Classical Islamic legal texts generally charge a murtadd, someone who is considered a backslider, with greater punishment: i.e. the murtadd be killed, intelligible for inheritance etc. I thank Najib Burhani for sharing his vast knowledge on this issue.

⁷ This notion can be found in i.e. writings and statements in popular Islamic websites in Indonesian language such as Hartono Ahmad Jai and M. Amin Djamaluddin’s “iniAlasan mengapa Ahmadiyah Sesat dan Menyesatkan” in www.ERAMUSLIM.COM, Ustādh Ja’far Sholih’s “Ajaran Kāfir Ahmadiyah” in www.darussalam.or.id and M. Shiddiq al-Jawi in www.khilafah1924.org.
in many ways, current trends of labelling “murtadd” and “kāfir” have possibly been inspired by the works of such scholars.

In response, in 1985 Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia published a book to counter the MUI fatwa and the increasing public scrutiny over their community (Jemaat Ahmadiyah Indonesia 1985). The book, entitled Kami Orang Islam (We Are Muslims), is a plea to their Muslim counterparts, and the Indonesian public in general that despite all of the accusations and allegations made against them by the MUI, the Ahmadis are Muslims and they want to remain Muslims. They claim to follow all pillars of Islam, and they believe in them entirely. The only difference is in the interpretation of the finality of Muhammad’s prophethood. For mainstream Muslims, the finality of Muhammad is an absolute belief, meanwhile the Ahmadis believe that God’s communication with human beings does not end in Muhammad in the 7th Century, but it goes on and continue to this day to guide mankind.

In a recent article, Julian Millie studies two different textbooks for oratory styles in Islamic missions from the 1960s. The study reveals that Islamic orthodoxy has been a contested space, where different visions of Islam and its role in the public contend each other in Indonesia, even if they have shared the same ideals: social unity and national governance. As Millic suggests, this phenomenon as an indication of increased tension between the one-public and counter-public positions in contemporary discussion on Islam and the state in Indonesia (Millie 2012). In a new study of state policies on religion in Indonesia, Ismatu Ropi has convincingly argues that while the state has all the power in political matters, the recent condition of uncertainties in religious affairs regarding, i.e. the fate of Ahmadiyah followers, has brought a number of parties within the society to “take over” the authority, which has been continuously contested (Ropi 2012). In this case, religious reasons often play a significant role even if they
are actually a “mask” in legitimizing their pressure to both the government and society (ZTF 2012).

The Meccan Fatwas and Its Reproductions in Indonesia

Beside the fatwas from MUI on Ahmadiyyah, in general, there have been three forms of responses to the question of Ahmadiyyah Indonesia. First: the Ahmadiyyah must be banned, and the government must freeze all its missionary activities. Ahmadiyyah is heretical, deviant, and its adherents are “outside the fold of Islam.” The proponents of this argument are Indonesia’s current most conservative Muslim groups such as the FPI (Islamic Defenders Front), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, FUI (Forum for Islamic Ummah), LPPI (Institute for the Study of Islam), DDII (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia) and Media Dakwah—these last two names have been closely associated with the figure of M. Natsir, one of an international key players in RAI/WML from Indonesia. Former Minister of Justice and Human Rights Yusril Ihza Mahendra made a statement that the best solution for the Ahmadiyyah question in Indonesia is to ask Ahmadiyyah declares itself a new religion outside Islam (Mahendra 2008; Avonius 2008) — a conceptual framework possibly inspired by Indian Muslim philosopher Sir Muhammad Iqbal after his sudden change of heart towards the Ahmadis in 1935 (Jalal 2000: 366; Valentine 2008). Mahendra’s position on Ahmadiyyah has pushed the question and further the debate; it has then been frequently reproduced as statements in public to pass judgment on Ahmadiyyah in different rhetoric, including those of opinions by the Minister of Religious Affairs M. Maftuh Basyuni and Habib Rizieq Syihab of FPI.

The second response: the Ahmadiyyah should not be banned, but the organization should not be allowed to proselytize its teachings to others. While the Ahmadiyyah has the rights to exist in Indonesia, Ahmadiyyah teachings are considered misguided, and misleading. In June 2008, a law, locally known as SKB Tiga Menteri (a joint ministerial decree) was passed to curtail
Ahmadiyah and restrict its missionary activities. The Ahmadis are allowed to observe their religious activities, as long as they do it inside their own community (Badan Litbang Agama dan Diklat Keagamaan 2008). This is the current government position. Basically this law was passed to ban the Ahmadi from practicing their religion openly. Although the government does not endorse any violence against the Ahmadis, militant groups such as the FPI has interpreted as a pretext to launch attacks towards Ahmadiyah.

In 2008, Adnan Buyung Nasution of President Advisory Council disagreed with the draft and urged the government to cancel the decree release. He thinks that as a citizen, Ahmadis have every right to life in Indonesia. He asserts that the Ahmadiyah has been present in Indonesia since 1925, and Ahmadi intellectuals have produced English books on religion that have inspired many Indonesians, including the young elites and highly educated circles such as the then president Sukarno etc.

The third response: Ahmadiyah has the constitutional rights to practice their freedom of religion. By restraining the Ahmadiyah, the state has provided an official endorsement of religious intolerance. The state has allowed the criminalization of religion. Instead, the state should protect the Ahmadis, because as Indonesian citizens, they are entitled to practice their religion. This is the position held by progressive, and human rights activist groups. “Reject the violence in the name of religion.” [The amusing response to this came from anti-Ahmadi supporters: how you always put your efforts to protect the human rights for such minority and misguided group as Ahmadiyah? Don’t you think we, the majority of Muslims, should also be entitled to our human rights to protect our religion from a misguided, misleading doctrine?]

The supporters of the first group rallied against the Ahmadiyah on the streets, stood up in protests in front of parliament members, and swamped the Islamic gatherings with
the derogatory slogans, saying “Dissolve Ahmadiyah!” “Ahmadiyah desecrating and tarnishing Islamic faith.” A young FPI preacher, during an Islamic gathering in Ciamis, seen in a Youtube video that went viral, screaming: “Kill Ahmadiyah... wherever they are.” The mob pelted the Ahmadi mosques, burnt down their houses—this has been a recurring and most extreme form of their protest. In February 2011, a thousand villagers raided an Ahmadi house in Cikeusik, Banten province and killed four Ahmadis.

For the conservatives, the SKB provides a legal certainty, thus provides Muslims assurance about the status of Ahmadiyah. Otherwise, they always argue, the ummah often feel uneasy about it, masyarakat resah (the community becomes worried). However, after the release of SKB, some of them were not very happy, they still feel something missing in the decree. SKB, they argue, does restrict but it does not dissolve and freeze the Ahmadiyah as an organization.

While the politics of intolerance against Ahmadiyah has continued to grow, religious harmony hit a new low. On June 1st, 2008, an angry mob attacked a group of people during a rally commemorating the Pancasila Day by the National Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Belief. A number of people sustained severe injuries including some Jakarta-based prominent Muslim activists participating in the rally—Guntur Romli, M. Syafii Anwar and Ahmad Suaedy—whose views on Islam and pluralism had long been a target of assault (Tempo Interaktif 2008). The attackers, mostly were members of FPI-affiliated Laskar Islam (Warriors of Islam), declared that the gathering was meant to uphold and support the Ahmadiyah. Munarman, a former bright human right activist-cum-commander of the Warriors of Islam, an Islamic paramilitary group, says that the fight against Ahmadiyah misguided teaching by certain groups have a constitutional basis, quoting the Article of 28 and 29 of the 1945 Constitution. But he
contends that even human rights have its limits: restriction for protection. In his words, "basic beliefs of others should be protected from desecration of the other party." For Munarman and others in his group, the Ahmadiyyah has manipulated Islam, using the umbrella and the cloth of Islam, while believing more on the Tadzkirah, the Ahmadi sacred text, rather than the Qur’an. Many, however, accuse that their defense of Muslims and their fight against the Ahmadis are yet another effort to mobilize and recruit memberships. Thus, in retrospect, what happened on early June of 2008 in Jakarta was a recurring pattern of incidents like those of Lahore and Pakistan in 1953 and early 1970s involving the aggressive and violent Muslims attacking the other parties of allegedly promoting religious freedom for Ahmadiyyah groups in Jakarta, Banten and elsewhere.

In most recent case of 2011 Ahmadiyyah attack in Banten, another group of lawyers have come to the fore and try to defend the anti-Ahmadi movement. Mahendradatta, who calls his group the Tim Pembela Muslim, Muslim Defence Team (TPM), contends that the incident occurred because of the stubbornness of the Ahmadis, they do not heed the SKB decree and, ultimately it was the attackers who took the law into their own hands. With the rise of Munarman, now a FPI spokesperson, and recently Mahendradatta of the TPM in their defense in radio, TV and public debates, the politics of intolerance have become more challenging.

Since the two incidents above, the debate was not geared towards the MUI fatwa; rather it has become more and more of the state and the Ahmadiyyah. By issuing the SKB, has the state become the defender of orthodoxy? Historian H.A. Drake investigates the root cause of conflicts between Christians and pagans and the influence of Constantine’s rule for the spread of Christianity in Rome. He observes that, while “intolerance may be a theological problem, coercion is a political one” (Drake 2000:xvi). As much as I want to argue that, intolerant fatwa given
by Islamic establishments to Ahmadiyyah points to a theological problem within certain Islamic circles, Indonesia’s particular manifestation of intolerance since the downfall of the New Order regime in 1998 points to the broadly political conditions.

It is interesting to observe that, while the 1953 anti-Ahmadi sentiments in Pakistan focusing on the Ahmadiyah belief-system and targeting the Ahmadi’s high ranking officials in the state (such as Pakistan’s first Minister of Foreign Affairs Sir Zafrullah Khan), Indonesian Ahmadiis did not belong to a group of such high positions in the government. If they do, the figures were less likely to get targeted politically.

This points out that the theological issue has been more profound in Indonesia. The theological debate among scholars and ulamas mostly circles around the problem with Ahmadiyah’s finality of prophethood and the problem with Ahmadiya’s ritual practices, as seen by the Muslim commoners at the grass-root level. Yet this does not stop the proponents of Indonesian anti-Ahmadi movements from mimicking the rhetoric and the politics of intolerance displayed by their counterparts in Pakistan. It seems, however, as in Pakistan, many groups have used anti-Ahmadi sentiments as a vehicle to further their own political and personal interests.

**Concluding Remarks**

Fatwas of MUI on Ahmadiyyah are an example of how a fatwa is produced and reproduced, and the ways in which Indonesian ulamas deal both the government and the society in addressing pressing issues in the community (Kaptein 2004; Mudzhar 1993). Unlike popular belief, the fatwas of MUI on Ahmadiyyah are not monolithic; in fact they have shown gradual level of decisions. Which brings to mind the social and political contexts within which the fatwa is being given, despite the fact that the MUI does not directly address or mention them.
This study argues that, despite the MUI fatwas may have some bearings on the increased political intolerance and growing violence towards Ahmadiyah, it is not until the fall of the New Order regime in 1999 that serious violence and intimidation took place. The last fatwa in 2005 has powerfully strengthened the tendency, making political intolerance and violent attacks on the Ahmadis one of the most serious problems in Indonesia.

While religious derogatory terms such as “kāfīr” and “murtadd” have been loosely used for years by many Muslims against the Ahmadis, it is worthy of note that, these terms do not come directly from MUI; at least not until it issued another edict against Ahmadiyah in 2005. These terms have been first and foremost invented, and reinvented by the anti-Ahmadi proponents to incite more hatred feelings, increased intolerance and other forms of intimidation.

Since the early 1970s Pakistani government has taken a path to give some rooms for Islamic groups, most of which have lesser or no sympathy to the Ahmadis. At the same time, the state is mobilized by public sentiments to take sides, making religious arguments more powerful than its own constitution. In this country, religious identity is no longer a matter of personal choice or self-identifying character, the state has all the power to define it (Qadeer 2006). Like in Pakistan, intolerance towards the Ahmadis in Indonesia can be metaphorically seen as more of a “marriage of convenience” between the propagandists who launch anti-Ahmadi campaigns for the state and use state authority to control others.

The role of international networks among ulamas and scholars — such as the RAI/WML and other Saudi-link Islamic organizations in Muslim countries — has been outstanding in framing and reframing the theological differences among Islamic groups, and the case in point against Ahmadiyah is a crucial example. Among the earliest recipients of Saudi’s most prestigious international awards were Mawdudi of Pakistan in
1979, and M. Natsir in 1980 for their service to Islam -- both were respectively given the King Faisal International Prizes, which nowadays are worth of approximately US $200,000. Thus, if there has been such a thing as an international nexus of global movement to exclude Ahmadiyah since 1950s or 1970s, Indonesia was, long before the varied attacks on Ahmadiyah in 2000s, well represented in this network. This, of course, despite the fact that the figures such as M. Natsir and H. M. Rasjidhi had obviously developed a larger vision for their Islamic and missionary projects in Indonesia, while planting the seeds of international Islam in the country. This is especially true because, most of the anti-Ahmadi movements were largely attributed to later, and newer generations of Muslim conservative groups such as FPI, FUI, Hizbut Tahrir, DDII, and LPPI, who might and might not inherit their legacies and share M. Natsir’s or H. M. Rasjidhi’s larger visions of Islam and the state. As much as they are credited for uniting, bringing together different groups of Muslims, this network must also be attributed for denouncing and excluding the Ahmadis from the rest of the Muslim communities, often against their will, virtually in all Muslim-majority countries.

References


Qadeer, Mohammad A. 2006. Pakistan: Social and Cultural Transformations in a Muslim Nation. London; New York:


Appendix: The Meccan Fatwa on Ahmadiyah (Arabic)

وفي الله، في الرسول، في القرآن، في الصلاة، في الصوم، في الحج، في الزكاة،
وبينا وبينهم خلاف جوهري في كل ذلك، صحفية (الفضل) في 30 من نور
( يوليو) 1331 م.

وجاء أيضاً في الصحيفة نفسها (المجلد الثالث) مانصه وإن ميرزا هو النبي
محمد عليه السلام (وبيضاً برسل باني من بعد اسمه أحمد) كتاب إصدار الخلافة
ص 31. واستعرض المجلسي أيضاً ماكتبه ونشره العلماء والكتاب الإسلاميون
النفقات عن هذه الفئة القادانية المحمدية ليبيان خروجهم عن الإسلام خروجاً
كلياً.

ويتناول ذلك اتخاذ المجلس النيابي الإقليمي للفصيلة الحدود الشمالية في
دولة باكستان قراراً في عام 1974م بإجماع أعضائه، يعتبر فيه الفئة القادانية
بين مواطني باكستان أقلية غير مسلمة، ثم في الجمعية الوطنية (مجلس الأمة
باكستاني العام لجميع المقاطعات) وافق أعضاؤها بالإجماع أيضاً على اعتبار
فئة القادانية أقلية غير مسلمة.

بضف إل إعقيدهم هذه، ماتبت النصوص الصريحة من كتب ميرزا غلام
أحمد نفسه، ومن رسائله المرجوة إلى الحكومة الإنجليزية في الهند، التي
يستدرها، ويسددي تأيدها واعظمها من إعلانه تحرير الجهاد، وإنه يفي فكرة
الجهاد، ليصرف قلوب المسلمين إلى الإخلاص للحكومة الإنجليزية المستمرة في
الهند، لأن فكرة الجهاد التي يدين بها بعض جهال المسلمين، تنميتهم من
الإخلاص للإنجليز. ويقول في هذا السياق في ملحق كتابية (شهادة القرآن)
الطريقة السادس ص 17 مانصه (أنا مؤمن به كلهما أزداد ابنامي وكثر عددهم
قل المؤمنون بالجهاد، لأنه يلزم من الإيمان باني المسيح، أو المهدي إنكار الجهاد)

28
تنتظر رسالة الأستاذ التدوي نشر الرابطة ٣٥.

ويعتبر أن تداول مجلس الجمع الفقيهي في هذه المستجدات وسواها من الوثائق الكثيرة المفصّلة عن عقيدة القاديانيين ومنشطها، وأسسها وأهدافها الخطيرة في تهديم العقيدة الإسلامية الصحيحة، وتحويل المسلمين عنها تحويلًا وتضليلاً، قرار المجلس بالإجماع: اعتبار العقيدة القاديانية المسماة أيضاً بالإخدرية، عقيدة خارجة عن الإسلام خروجاً كاملاً، وإن معتقداتها كفاف مرتديّة عن الإسلام، وأن تظهّر إهلها بالإسلام إنها هو للتضليل والخداع، ويعمل مجلس الجمع الفقيهي أنه يجب على المسلمين حكومات وعلماء، وكتاباً ومفكرين، ودعاة وغيرهم مكافحة هذه النحلة الضالة وأهلها في كل مكان من العالم...

وبالله التوفيق.

٣٥

فتب ترجمة

علي المهداي

الرئيس

النائب

النائب

النائب

محمد عبد الله العزيم

مصول

جعفر بن عبد الله السهم

غياث الدين

سماح

محمد رشيد جميل

عثمان

محمد رشيد قلبي

مخلص

ضياء

محمد رشيد السيد

هكجوم

محمد الفيصل

القديس

فاليري

محمد رشيد السيد

عثمان

محمد رشيد جميل

عثمان

محمد رشيد السيد

هكجوم

محمد الفيصل

القديس
About the Authors

Ali Fährudin

Ali Fährudin is a researcher at the Center for Religious literature and Heritage, Office for Research and Development and Training, Ministry of Religious Affairs since 2009. He finished his master degree at Department of Tafsir and Hadith, UIN Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta in 2006.

Azyumardi Azra

Azyumardi Azra is a Professor of history and Director of School of Graduate Studies of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta, Indonesia. He was rector of this university for two terms (1998-2006). He earned his MA and PhD degree in history from Columbia University (1992) with the dissertation “The Transmission of Islamic Reformism to Indonesia: Networks of Middle Eastern and Malay-Indonesian ‘Ulama’ in the 17th and 18th Centuries”. In May 2005 he was awarded Doctoral Degree Honoris Causa in Humane Letters from Carroll College, Montana, USA. He is also a Honorary Professorial Fellow, University of Melbourne, Australia (2004-9); and a member of Board of Trustees, International Islamic University, Islamabad, Pakistan (2004-9); and a member of Academic Development Committee, Aga Khan International University-Institute for the Study of Muslimin Civilisations (AKU-ISMIC), London (2006-8).
Dadi Darmadi

Dadi Darmadi is a researcher at the PPIM-UIN Syarif Hidayatullah, Jakarta. He is currently a Ph.D Candidate in Social Anthropology, Harvard University and was a Visiting Research Graduate Fellow at Duke Islamic Islamic Studies Center (DISC), Duke University, North Carolina, USA.

Erlita Tantri

Erlita Tantri is a Researcher at Research Center for Regional Resources, Indonesian Institute of Sciences (PSDR-LIPI). She finished her Bachelor from Department of Sociology, University of Indonesia and her Master from Department of History, Leiden University. She carried out research in some issues such as Social Capital, China’s Economic Reform, Natural Disaster and Social Dynamic. Now, she is involved and interested in themes of ecology, society and disaster management, mainly in historical and social perspectives.

Erni Budiwanti

Erni Budiwanti obtained her Ph.D in Cultural Anthropology at the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Monash University, Australia in 1997. She has been working with LIPI since 1986. Her major interests are on the studies of majority-minority relationship, sectarian movements, and localized Islam.

Fakhriati

Fakhriati is a researcher from Aceh who concentrates on Islamic manuscripts in Archipelago. She works as a researcher at Center for Research and Development of Religious Literature and Heritage, Office for Research, Development
and Training Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Republic of Indonesia since 2009. She has spent much time on performing research in Islamic manuscripts since she studied at Master Degree in Leiden University, from 1996 to 1998. To deal with the manuscripts thoroughly, she studied at Indonesian University at the doctoral level, from 2002 to 2007. Among of her works and researches that has been done since she finished her doctoral level are: cataloguing manuscripts in Dayah Tanoh Abe, Aceh in cooperation with UIN Jakarta and Tokyo University; identifying and digitizing Acehnese manuscripts sponsored by EAP British Library; editing texts; and performing research on watermark and countermark of Acehnese manuscripts’ papers. In addition, to increase networking in manuscripts, she has joined MANASSA (Masyarakat Pernaskahan Nusantara), PUSBIRA (Pusat Manukrip Nusantara), TIMA (The Islamic Manuscripts Association), and IPH (International Paper Historians). Her email address is fakhri_ati@yahoo.co.uk and fakhriati70@gmail.com.

Sofyan Hadi

Sofyan Hadi is a senior lecturer for Arabic language and literature at Department of Adab and Humanities Faculty, State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN) Imam Bonjol Padang, West Sumatra. Nowadays, he is finishing his Doctoral Program at Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University, Jakarta.
NOTES TO CONTRIBUTORS

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